The debate between realism and antirealism or irrealism has been one of the most important philosophical issues for a long time. Realism is described as embracing such mysterious notions as “identity across metaphysical possible worlds” and “the absolute conception of the world”; on the other hand, antirealism or irrealism is described as “irresponsible to the world”. Hilary Putnam claims that there is a third way with the realism issue which does justice to our sense that knowledge claims are responsible to reality without accepting metaphysical fantasy.
The aim of this article is to research how Putnam talks about natural realism which is responsible to reality. There are three parts in this article. In Part one, it is the study of the positions, including semantic externalism and internal realism, which Putnam advocates before he turns to natural realism. These positions are criticized by philosophers such as John McDowell and few others as the setting up of an interface between perceivers and the world, which he also comments as an unnecessary concept. The interface hinders us from talking about the world, and questions like ‘How does perception hook on to the world?’ and ‘How does language hook on to the world?’ have became urgent and insolvable problems. In Part two, the contents are further carried on the critics and Putnam’s new positions. The chapter starts with discussing the problem of perception. In part three, it is the argumentation of how Putnam talks about the fact-value entanglement which is the issue he concerns for a long time by means of his natural realism, and the arguments will help to understand Putnam’s epistemology without interface.
Keywords: natural realism, internal realism, semantic externalism, interface, pragmatism, Cartesian cum Materialist, logical positivism, relativism