The paper reviews the human rights crisis surrounding the Serbian policy of ethnic cleansing, the resulting refugee crisis, the NATO intervention, the present UN governance of this region and some current efforts to create a human rights regime in this troubled region.

Keywords: Kosovo/a, Albania, Serbian policy of ethnic cleansing, UN, human rights.
On March 28, 1999, the Serbs burned the house of Muhamet Belegu. Muhamet’s son was a fighter with the KLA (The Kosova Liberation Army). Later that day we gathered in the center of Peja. The Serbs told us to get into some large cars. In the city center the Serbs shot into the crowd sporadically. The children were frightened and cried. We arrived in Prizren. We got out of the cars and walked. We saw many dead bodies between Gjakova and Prizreni road, as many as twenty. Many of the dead were children.

Near to Zhur, ..., we encountered a Serb checkpoint. The Serbs were wearing camouflage uniforms. They took our documents and tore them before our eyes. The Serbs separated the males from the females. They forced us to raise three fingers (the Serb salute which represents the “father, son and holy ghost” in the orthodox tradition) and to stand on one foot. They put their revolvers to our heads and asked for money.

Later we were permitted to move on (to Albania).

Testimony of Jusuf Belegu, 37 years old
Dardania, Peja, Kosova

In March 1999 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) took military action for the protection of the people of Kosovo/a. Until that unprecedented decision, few observers paid attention to this region of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Kosova’s history is an ancient one, yet in the midst of the disillusionment of the Socialist world, which included the breakup of the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia,
events in the region of nearly two million people were little known other than by those who were directly concerned or by Balkan specialists.

Kosovo, as it is named in the Serbian language, was for a time a semi-autonomous region of the FRY. After 1989, led by President Slobodan Milosevic, the Serbian led FRY dominated and abused Kosovar Albanians igniting a rebellion led by the Kosova Liberation Army (KLA), {in Albanian, Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës (UÇK)}. As KLA and Serbian military responses escalated, in September 1991 the Albanians unofficially declared their independence. In September 1998 the situation became so critical that the UN Security Council passed Res. 1199 concluding that, “the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region.” The resolution demanded that “all parties cease hostilities...(and that) the security forces used for civilian repression be withdrawn.”

On February 7, 1999 the international peace conference, held in Rambouillet, France began, only to fail in March 1999. With the collapse of a diplomatic solution, on March 24, 1999, NATO forces began an air attack on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Now the world and its media focused its attention on the plight of the Albanian people who made up approximately 90% of Kosova’s population and on the Serbs claiming Kosovo as theirs to dominate.

Undeniably this is a major event in history at the close of the twentieth century. A nineteen-state alliance took action in the name of humanitarian intervention.1[1] No military action of this dimension has ever been carried out before in the name of protecting human rights principles. Certainly the events surrounding the inaction in the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the ethnic killing in Rwanda led the international community to respond differently in this crisis. Unquestionably scholars will argue the legality of this action well into the future. Its precedent value, its meaning for the UN Charter and its deterrent effect is still yet to be determined. During the crisis the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), established by the UN, indicted, among others, the President of the FRY, Slobodan

1. See Javier Solana (1999: 114) (former NATO Secretary-General)
Milosevic. The outcome of those cases is yet to be determined. Justice, simply, is still in process.

Despite the critical legal and political issues it must be made clear that, above all, this was a human crisis that affected millions of civilians. Families were forced to leave their homes via threat of death. They were forced to abandon homes and villages where they and their ancestors had lived for centuries. The men were separated from their families, many never to be seen again. Their houses were shelled and intentionally torched. In flight children, often led by women, but sometimes alone, joined columns of refugees on the long often-arduous trek to safety. In packed cars, overflowing buses, tractors, in wheelbarrows and by foot they left for a refuge from hate that Albania willingly and Macedonia reluctantly provided. Along the way they were stopped by Serb police, masked paramilitary forces and soldiers. The refugees were forced to relinquish their valuables and papers, made to pay sums to be allowed to continue, insulted, assaulted and forced to leave their homeland.

The events, while horrific, were tales filled not just with horror, but also with compassion and care on the part of those that welcomed them. Families, Non-Governmental Organizations, International Organizations all joined in a massive effort to provide shelter for the refugees from the reign of terror they had escaped. Nearly a million people, 459,000[2] refugees in Albania, found temporary shelter, whether it was in a tent city, in a makeshift camp on the side of the road, or in a crowded apartment shared with relatives, friends or generous strangers. It was hoped that the stay was to be short, but the events compelled them to stay longer than anticipated. Albanian families living in small and inadequate apartments cared for their Kosovar guests under stressful conditions. Relief organizations arranged for food packages to help, but certainly the conditions made life difficult for the Albanian hosts, who were often financially incapable of providing for their own. The camps varied in size and quality of life, but as time went on their organization became a massive challenge, that the UNHCR, donor governments and NGOs more often than not met. Despite expected disorganization, the refugees were sheltered, fed and provided with medical care, although some lived better than others. The Albanian government even started summer school programs. Incredibly there was no incidents
of food riots, epidemics or xenophobic outbreaks against the refugees. Although later, with their departure, there was widespread looting of the camps and the theft of valuables that were left behind. In the aftermath the UNHCR would come under outside and self-criticism over the inadequacies of planning and their inability to quickly meet the demands of the crisis.

Then in early June 1999, less than three months after the campaign began; NATO’s strategy of air attacks on strategic targets resulted in Serbia agreeing to vacate Kosova.

The refugees quickly returned to Kosova, more quickly than anticipated. KFOR and refugee officials were concerned that their return would be greeted with landmines, booby traps and military violence. They returned to villages and to houses that were severely damaged and often inhabitable. To build again and to live without fear and with the ability to speak and be Albanian in their own homes, schools and institutions was the aim of the international community’s policy. Its realization is a reality that was and is hard to implement.

The UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), NATO (KFOR), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE, OMIK), the European Union (EU, EAR) were left with the complex and overwhelming task of creating order and governance. In the vacuum of the departure of FRY forces, the KLA, set up a provisional government, attempting to convert their military action into a political force to provide representative government. The KLA’s political opponents, the LDK (League for a Democratic Kosova) also continued to claim the right to rule. With the Albanian Kosovars returning, the Kosovar Serbs left in large numbers, sometimes from fear of reprisal, some as a result of actual vengeful attacks and some from a decision not to live amongst an Albanian majority. Those that remained often faced harassment, sometimes seeking refuge in NATO protected Serb churches and enclaves. UNMIK in order to protect Kosovar Serbs and give them a livelihood in order to encourage them to stay and improve the possibility of a multiethnic society, hired many Serbs to assist UN efforts. Yet ultimately many if not most left for Serbia. For those who did not, they remain, even today long after the fighting stopped, protected by KFOR in enclaves or churches.

Many Orthodox Churches, especially those that were political symbols, were
damaged or destroyed. Whether these acts were done spontaneously or were planned as a concerted political strategy is yet to be determined.

The Roma (Gypsies), who were either forced to assist the Serb authorities in their actions against Albanians or opportunistically took advantage of Serb policy to gain property or advantage, became targets of revenge. Many left their homes for safety in Orthodox Church enclaves or were forced to retreat to refugee camps as far away as Macedonia.

These events have altered not only Kosova and the FRY, but also Albania. The politics of this region has been and will be affected by what happened in Kosova. From a broader perspective, future political events in the turbulent Balkans will likely be affected by the Kosova crisis, but as of now it is undetermined. Unquestionably, an appreciation of this conflict is critical to understanding Balkan politics and its impact on Europe and the United States.

Perhaps even more critical for the future are the lessons, both successes and failures, of the international community. In part, the future actions of the world in response to widespread ethnic cleansing and/or genocide will be dependent on how we assess the Kovovo/a crisis. One hope of the international action was that this type of tragedy should not be repeated either in the Balkans, Europe or any other part of the world. To avoid its repetition the story needs to be told in a clear and objective fashion, but not devoid of human feeling and emotion.

(Excerpted from proposed Chapter 10)

President William Jefferson Clinton, Kosovo, Nov. 23, 1999

No one can force you to forgive what was done to you. But you must try.
The political future of Kosova/o remains uncertain. The possibility of it becoming an independent state or a semi-autonomous region of the FRY is for future decision making. Its fate at this juncture is, to a large extent, left to the international community influenced by geo-politics and responding to the disputes that are left unresolved as well as the future of governance within Serbia. Yet, its ultimate prospects will undoubtedly be shaped by the Kosovar Albanians, whom now represent a large majority of the population. Until governmental authority officially and totally leaves the hands of the international community, the Albanians and their political parties, the KLA, the LDK and the other Albanian parties, must play a waiting game, attempting to exert their influence within the UN structure. For the moment they must build their support among their constituencies, attempt to influence events that will impact UN policy-making via a UN government and prepare for a future where they hope they will govern without the necessity of being part of a UN authority. The reality they must contend with is that the day to day governance of Kosovar is now officially in the hands of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) which was led by its Chief Administrator (the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Kosovo), French national, Dr. Bernard Kouchner. Dr. Kouchner replacement, the former Danish Minister of Defense Hans Haekkerup will assume the leadership duty beginning January 2001.

For the Albanian Kosovars, the realization that their saviors from Serb atrocities,
NATO and the UN, are now their protectors is both welcomed and frustrating. While the Albanians are now the dominant population in number, their political associations neither have the legitimacy or resources to be masters of their own fate. 4

The influence they exert is only with the permission of UNMIK via a power sharing arrangement which established the Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS) in December 1999. (Gall, 1999)

UNMIK continues, as UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (para. 11) makes perfectly clear the body that retains, “…the main responsibilities of the international civil presence…Its role includes: (a)Performing basic civilian administrative where and as long as required;” and “(e) Facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status…” as well as“(i)Maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local police forces and meanwhile through the deployment of international police personnel to serve in Kosovo.”

Compounding this governmental limbo is the lack of resources available to UNMIK, making their task of provisional authority more difficult in their inability to effectively deal with the myriad of issues that are involved in the Kosova reconstruction effort. Lack of water, frequent electricity failures and yet to be repaired bridges, add to the frustrations of effective governance and leave Kosovars attempting to rebuild in the midst of war destruction and without adequate means to address the effort. The delay in sending the European funds promised for the day to day administration of Kosova, some forty-five million dollars (March 2000), makes it difficult to not only police the province but to operate the schools and the other services essential to bring Kosova to a condition of normalcy. (New York Times, 2000b: A.23) Critics of UNMIK administration claim that the shortfall in funds is compounded by “a cumbersome structure and the lack of unified support of the Security Council”, but also claim that “the mission itself has been lumbering and
inefficient at times. (Rohde, 2000) Yet the reconstruction effort continues with 180 million EUR earmarked by the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) for infrastructure and the development of Kosovo for 2000. (EAR, 2000)

Once Serbian forces left Kosova the United Nations became the legitimate authority of a region that is legally still part of the Serbian Republic of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. While Security Council Res. 1244 reaffirms, “the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia...” (preambular para.10), it also calls for and decides to “Promote the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, taking full account of annex 2 and of the Rambouillet accords..."(preambular para. 11, para. 11 (a). Yet, as is made clear from ‘annex 2’ (para.5) in describing the principles of the interim administration of UNMIK; self-government will be considered within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Its principle terms of operation states “...under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to be decided by the Security Council...” (emphasis added). Thus, these terms of operation seemingly limit, at least for now, the possibilities of an independent Kosova republic. Until and unless there is a reversal of the previous Security Council Resolution and an approval of a new set of principles the prospects for an independent Kosova recognized by the United Nations may be an impossibility.

In filling this governmental limbo, UNMIK’s, according to the Security Council (Resolution 1244) is the interim administration and the only legitimate governing authority in Kosovo. The resolution states in pertinent part,
As it is clear from this mandate, UNMIK’s governing policy is committed to a multiethnic society, yet the reality is that since its authority was extended, Kosova has moved increasingly to be a mono-ethnic region. Ironically Milosevic’s nationalistic policies resulted in the virtual ethnic cleansing of Serbs from an Albanian Kosova. How long UNMIK will be the legitimate governing authority is left to future events not yet determined, but in the interim they, along with KFOR, remain the difference between order and anarchy.

As OSCE Ambassador, Daan Everts, its chief representative in Kosova, told a Dutch television station in The Hague (7 November, 1999) that peacekeepers will probably be needed in Kosova for up to another 10 years evidenced by the increasing attacks on the Serbian and Roma minorities in the province. (RFE/RL, 1999a)

Reports of Serb killings were as high as a 114 per week when the Albanians returned to Kosova in August/September to thirty-two per week in November and seven by the end of that month. (Lacy, 1999) Many attribute this Albanian violence towards Serbs simply as revenge. In fact the OSCE in the Executive Summary of its report, Kosovo/Kosova, As Seen, As Told, was to state, “Throughout the regions the desire for revenge has created a climate in which the vast majority of human rights violations have taken place.”(OSCE, 1999: xi) While retribution is a strong motive, it does not adequately explain the violence.

It is difficult for Kosovar Albanians to forgive former Serb neighbors who they know participated in the ethnic cleansing that killed their loved ones, destroyed their homes and disrupted their lives. As one Albanian who hid with his family in a basement for months related, “how do you cordially greet your neighbor on the street, who several
months ago was part of the killing that threatened your life and that of your family?”

Complicating matters are the large numbers of Albanians whose homes were destroyed during the conflict. With no place to be housed in the destroyed villages, large numbers moved to the urban centers, only to discover that Serbs remain in apartments. The pragmatic need for accommodation combined with a sense of Albanian victory over a Serb aggressor, along with the anger of being forced to seek refuge, gave many Albanian Kosovars a sense that justice supports their striking out against Kosovar Serbs. Reason often has given way to an innate sense that the recent history allows for self-help in the name of justice.

The international force that makes up NATO’s effort in Kosovo bears the acronym KFOR for Kosovo Implementation Force. With the departure of Serb police and military forces KFOR assumed the role of protectors of the peace. With nearly 40,000 soldiers from NATO countries, The United Kingdom, France, The United States, Spain, Portugal, etc. joined by Russian, Finish, UAE, etc. troops, the peace of Kosova is entrusted. At first, KFOR was the only presence to ensure that anarchy would not prevail. In August, the streets of Prishtina were patrolled only by KFOR whose helicopters flew low among the blocks of apartments, with searchlights to brighten the streets they were to protect.

KFOR began to patrol the streets with military vehicles giving the Kosovar cities the appearance of an occupied war zone. In one sense the protection allowed for Albanians to live freely, expressing their culture and speaking their language without fear of Serb harassment or reprisal. Since their return each evening Albanians take their traditional evening walk, “Xhiro” (English pronunciation Jiro), protected by NATO forces, like the Royal British Battalion and now joined by an international
Free from Serbian political domination they are now free to meet their relatives and neighbors without fear of persecution. The sense of freedom to be Albanian is apparent and overwhelming.

Yet the need for KFOR to maintain a peace that includes a commitment to a multiethnic Kosova remains long after the return of the refugees. Thirty thousand of the original forty thousand troops continue to be stationed in the Kosova with another seven thousand in Albania and Macedonia.

International Police Force

UNMIK in an attempt to begin a normalization process turned to the international community to create an international police presence to replace the military as the primary force of law and order. Police volunteers, coming from as diverse places as Miami Beach to Malaysia, joined the effort. By November 1999 there were 1,700 police persons patrolling the streets and markets of Kosova. There remains a short-fall of police, with the number reporting less than half than promised from the international community. UNMIK claims this lack of support did not allow for an appropriate response to the violence that erupted in Mitrovica 6[6] (see below). Without an additional police presence the hopes of a multiethnic Kosova will not be realized. The longer the mobilization takes the promise and reality of a multiethnic Kosova fades.

This became clear, not only in Mitrovica but with disturbances in Prishtina (November 1999) that resulted in Amnesty International (AI) expressing concern “that unless the international community deploys the required number of international civilian police necessary to maintain law and order in Kosovo, violent human rights abuses will continue”. AI called for the full complement of the 4,718 requested by the
The result of the violence directed at Serbs meant by the end of 1999 there were estimated only 600 Serbs left living in Prishtina. Their absence adds to the success of the Albanians to create a nationalist state and the failure of the international community to secure the conditions for their stated goal of a multiethnic society.

As the UNMIK police effort and KFOR units continue to assume the responsibility for the peace and security of Kosova it is inevitable that issues of appropriate responses will come into question. The complexities of maintaining peace and security in this troubled region are legion. As late as January 2000 Amnesty called upon the commander of the international security presence in Kosovo KFOR, General Reinhardt, to “establish a transparent and independent mechanism for dealing with complaints against KFOR troops...” (International Secretariat of Amnesty International, 2000)

With the UN international police presence and the continued reliance on KFOR troops to maintain the peace the problems of clear authority and preparedness have created considerable issues. As one NATO official was reported to say, “The longer our soldiers carry out police duties, the greater the risk of casualties or soldiers getting into trouble...” Accordingly there continues to be a call for enlarging the international police presence and to remove NATO soldiers from police duties that undoubtedly complicate their role. (Becker, 2000)
The Kosova Liberation Army (KLA) with the international community’s encouragement and support was converted into a civilian entity, the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC or TMK [Trupat e Mbrotjtjes se Kosovës] as it is known in Albanian). These former fighters for Albanian liberation were to be transformed into an entity that technically has no police function. The KPC/TMK is supposedly an emergency corps modeled after the French Securite Civile and was created to respond to disasters, help in rebuilding and provide humanitarian aid and be multiethnic in character. (Solana, 1999: 119) Yet the ambiguity of their situation leaves much uncertainty and confusion. Reports of the Corps maintaining detention camps and serving as a de facto police authority are numerous. The respect that the KLA earned among Albanians during the period of ethnic cleansing and the refugee flight leaves a strong sense of expectation among Albanian Kosovars. The Corps, ostensibly multiethnic, but with its composition largely Albanian, is seen by many as an “Kosovar army and police force in waiting” with this interim period to be used as a time for preparation and training. The rather ambiguous status of the Corps complicates matters and yet provides a sense of what will be for Albanian Kosovars. One report in December 1999 noted that “Over 10,000 people have applied to join the TMK (KPC) so far and a total of 5,000 recruits are planned for, including a reserve numbering 2,000... These new TMK officers are imposing their own law and order - with arms. They are stopping traffic, checking documents. They are encountering opposition from KFOR.” (Igric, 1999)

Impatient dissatisfaction with the civilian corps was expressed in early 2000 by former KLA guerillas that quit the KPC/TMK. They stated that the corps is not living up to "the expectations of the UCK regarding how to defend Kosova." According to a report stated “Observers note that the differences reflect the contrast between the UN view of the KPC/TMK as a civilian work force and the UCK’s hope that it will form the core of a new army.” (RFE/RL, 2000a)

Of additional concern to KFOR’s continued mandate to control and police Kosova is the reality that some of the former KLA soldiers have continued their battle with the Serbians over the border in Kosovar Albanian populated Serbian towns. It was reported that a band of KLA fighter, supposedly organized in January, have been
operating in towns like Dobrosin across the Kosova/Serbian border. General Reinhart, the NATO commander was encouraging American troops to beef up their control of the border to insure that this does not re-ignite a active war that will force NATO to reengage. (Erlanger, 2000c) While KFOR troops continue to search and seize weapons, ammunition and military uniforms near Kosova's border with southern Serbia as well as northern Kosova, it is apparent that this exercise is fruitless without the full cooperation of the belligerents to give up their commitment to battle.

The destruction and damage done to Orthodox churches since the return of the Albanians to Kosova is a disturbing reality that brings deserved international criticism against the victims of Serbian ethnic cleansing. By November 1999 “more than 70 Serbian Orthodox churches, monasteries and holy places have been damaged or destroyed”.8[8] In August the large Orthodox Church that sits next to the University of Prishtina was damaged by a bomb. A Gjacova church, near the local KLA headquarters was destroyed by Albanians in a party like event.

Churches have been the targets of Albanians since the departure of the Serbs. KLA officials are quick to note that they have not organized a concerted attack on religious sites, but note that the targets have been recently built Serbs churches. The claim made is that these religious sites were constructed as political statements of Serb authority over Albanian Kosovars and is thus the focus of Albanian anger. In interviews with KLA provisional government officials it was pointed out that the attacks cannot be controlled and that in any case they are selected targets not of old established churches, but the more recently constructed which are symbolic of the Serb desire to make Kosovo a pure Serb region.9[9] Evidence does not totally support the KLA statements, among the destroyed religious sites are “the Church of

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8. Erlanger (2000c), A more conservative number, was attributed to the Serbian Orthodox Church in a US State Department Report, id. NYT, Dec.10, 1999.
Ascension of the Mother of God built in 1315 in Musutist, St. Marko monastery built in 1467 in Korisa (Prizren) and other religious buildings of priceless historical and artistic value…” (Aim-Internet report, 1999a)

KFOR and UNMIK in a desire to keep Kosovo as a multiethnic state have provided protection for the religious sites. But events clearly show that removal of protection will result in disaster, as in the case of the Serbian Orthodox church in the village of Donji Zakut, which was set fire in the early hours of 9 November 1999. (RFE/RL, 1999b) Similarly, it on the night of January 14, 2000 “the Serbian Orthodox Church of Saint Ilija was severely damaged in an explosion. A large bomb was planted in the church grounds and the resulting explosion destroyed half of the church and three nearby Serb houses. The US KFOR checkpoint is situated only 70 meters from the church.” (Berisha, 2000)

From the moment the Albanian Kosovars returned from their refuge in Albania, Macedonia, and elsewhere, the plight of the Kosovar Serbs became a complex and difficult problem. Despite the UN commitment to a multiethnic Kosovo the reality of protecting a Serb minority in the midst of an embittered Albanian majority is overwhelming. In an attempt to retain a pluralistic Kosovo the UN employs Kosovar Serbs as staff in order not only to provide a livelihood, but a semblance of protection.

Ironically since the salaries of International Organizations employees is considerably higher than that of the ordinary Kosovar it has created a situation where resentment has grown. “Professors, public employees of all descriptions are not receiving their minimal salaries while a driver or interpreter for an international organization receives around 1,000 DM a month, six or seven times the average income... Only a few hundred such jobs exist, while the rest of the population is left to cope with the effects of Kosovo's fractured economy.” (Mushkolaj, 2000) While Kosovar Albanians are employed by IGOs the fact that many Serbians are on the international organization payroll certainly exacerbates the resentment towards the remaining Kosovar Serbian minority.
KFOR has an enormous task to protect Serbs from threat and attack. In Pristina in the summer of 1999 assisting KFOR was a voluntary group, known as SOS, who manned telephones receiving complaints from citizens who are threatened and then dispatching KFOR soldiers who provide protection. This group, made up mostly of Kosovar Serbs along with several Albanian volunteers remained virtual prisoners in a Pristina apartment protected by British soldiers, working night and day to provide protection for Kosovars.

Despite the efforts of this group and KFOR, Serb property went largely unprotected. “By the end of January 2000, displaced persons from Kosovo had submitted to the Humanitarian Law Center (HLC), 1,327 complaints against the violation of their property rights.” The HLC, a well-respected NGO went on to report:

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20% of the complainants said they were made to leave their apartments or houses under threat of death or were forcibly evicted by unidentified ethnic Albanians, who were most frequently armed and wearing Kosovo Liberation Army uniforms. This group of displaced said they were subjected to physical and psychological abuse even before being thrown out of their homes. Many called the Kosovo Force or the UN Mission in Kosovo police for help but neither were able to provide them with adequate protection.

(Humanitarian Law Center Communique, 2000)

Kosovar Serbs and Roma are for now almost all living in enclaves protected by KFOR. Serbs in Pristina and other mixed communities require a military KFOR escort to leave their homes and conduct daily tasks like buying food. Where Serbs remain, “ethnically pure environments enclaves” have evolved which must be protected by KFOR. For those Serbs who were banished from cities or villages they are guarded by KFOR units. Gracanica, Kosovska, Kamenica, northern part of Mitrovica, are examples of such enclaves. In Rahovec where about “4,500 Serbs and Romanies live in some kind of ghetto, surrounded by barbed wire in the area which covers a single street with the church and village cafe. Even food and drugs are brought to them by convoys with military escorts.” (Aim-Internet report, 1999a)
At the edge of Prishtina sits the Serb village of Graanica. At either end of the roads that lead to this village are KFOR checkpoints separating this enclave from the adjoining Albanian villages. With the Cyrillic signs welcoming you it is immediately apparent that this is Serb territory. It is estimated that six thousand Serbs live in this enclave, virtual prisoners with some of the inhabitants leaving each day for work with intergovernmental organizations and NGOs. Among its residents is the moderate Serbian Orthodox priest Father Sava, who protected Albanians during the bombing and now is under protection within his church by KFOR (Rohde, 2000). It is also home to the leader of the Serb Orthodox Church in Kosovo, Bishop Artemije, who is open to discussion with western leaders despite objections from Belgrade.

Its small Greek supported hospital, like Mitrovica’s (see below) is a bone of contention among the various Serb factions and the doctors have been threatened by the Serbian authorities not to cooperate or lose their Serbian pensions and support. (WSJ, 2000)

For Albanians travelling through these roads fear of assault often deters them from entering. For the Serbians who remain in this protectorate their lives are largely limited to the protected enclaves which is a constant reminder of their isolation in Kosova and the desperate nature of their plight.

The tension in this Serb enclave exploded with a grenade attack on June 6, 2000 that injured five Serbs which resulted in the inhabitants of Graanica attacking Swedish KFOR troops. (RFE/RL, 2000e)

Mitrovica, the city northwest of Prishtina remains one of the most volatile situations for Kosova’s future. Its problems are symbolic and representative of the ethnic issues that are very far from resolved throughout Kosova. Mitrovica is divided in two sectors
via a bridge spanning the Ibar River with Serbs concentrated in an enclave in the North of the city (90% of the population) and Albanians to the South. French KFOR troops, who regularly seek support from other KFOR units, attempt to protect the two sides from each other. While Serbs are largely on one side of the river (estimated at 9,000), many Albanians live among them (estimated at 1,000 to 1,500 in the city with an approximate total of 20,000 north of the Ibar river), leaving this Kosovar city split with a military presence protecting each from open assault. The city, which is nearby to the valuable iron-ore and precious metals mines of Trepça, maybe the last battleground between Serb control and Kosova independence. (Gall, 2000)

Unquestionably Serbia, Serbian and Albanian Kosovars view the control of this mineral rich area as central to a Kosova’s future and are willing to risk violent action. (Erlanger, 2000a) The forty-two mines controlled by the Trepça Conglomerate, are seen as valuable to the Serbian economy in strengthening trade with the rest of Serbia. Similarly the Thaçi provisional government attempted to control this industry only to be thwarted by inaccessibility to the Serbian controlled facilities. (OSCE, 1999: 93)

This city, under constant siege functions far from normal, making it clear that the ethnic conflict continues to take a heavy human toll. The Mitrovica city hospital, located in the north Serbian controlled part of the city, is a tragic example of the unresolved problems with implications for the very basic health needs of the community. French KFOR soldiers on duty at the entrance of the hospital grounds witnessed a hospital emptied of Albanian staff, due to the demands of the Serbian administrator and the withdrawal of Albanian employees. (OSCE, 1999: 95) The hospital remains poorly equipped despite Serbian promises of aid, incapable to properly treat the ill. (Aim-Internet report, 1999b)

As late as May 2000 the hospital was off limits to Albanians living in the southern side of the city, as the French troops are not able to guarantee their safety in the zone where the hospital stands. The nearly quarter of a million Albanians are limited in their care from an inadequate clinic and a Moroccan medical team working from tents. UNMIK gave the Serbs an ultimatum to accept Albanians or UN assistance would be

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10. See Svetlana Djurdjevic Lukic, "Mitrovica Serbs Dig In," IWPR'S Balkan Crisis Report 121, March 3, 2000, "Around 20,000 Albanians live on the other side of the Ibar. Many of them are also recent arrivals, refugees from northern Mitrovica and villages destroyed before and during the NATO bombardment."
withdrawn. Belgrade continues to fund and equip the hospital. ( Ademi, 2000 )

Mitrovica erupted in dramatic violence in February 2,000 with the death of ethnic Albanians and others injured including Serbs and French peacekeepers. With Serbs rampaging an Albanian enclave after there was an attack on a Serbian cafe ( Erlanger, 2000b: A.1 ), the French KFOR units, in an attempt to quell the disturbances, arrested forty, thirty-nine Albanians and one Serb. When the French were unable to contain the disturbances KFOR reinforced the French with British, German, Belgian, and Italian troops. ( New York Times, 2000a: A26 ) Reports by local Albanian residents claimed that French KFOR troops failed to respond to requests for assistance during Serb rioting. It was reported that Albanians welcomed the arrival of the British troops to check what they believed was the less than objective French units, but Serbs were less enthusiastic. Serbs argued that the British hadn’t helped to protect Serbs in Prishtina were the population declined from 40,000 to only a few hundred and were less than pleased with their arrival. ( Semini, 2000a )

If Kosovar is to be a multiethnic state certainly Mitrovica cannot remain segregated and a continued hotbed for ethnic tension and violence. In February 2000, NATO called for reinforcements to quell the disturbances after three hundred American soldiers were stoned by Serbian Kosovars, when they attempted to search for weapons. Whether additional KFOR soldiers will bring peace to Mirovica is questionable until there is an ultimate settlement of the ethnic conflict throughout Kosova. The Serb response as well as the march of 20,000 ethnic Albanians from Prishtina to Mitrovica on 21 February, when they demanded an end to the partition of Kosova is indicative of the intensity of feelings regarding the status of Mitrovica.

Further complicating matters is the lack of integration of NATO’s command structure. With each of the national contingents reporting to their own capitals, an integrated
security plan is difficult to obtain. Also the reluctance on many commanders to become embroiled in the quagmire of Mitrovica makes the task of maintaining a peace all the more difficult. Mitrovica’s problems like the rest of Kosova must go beyond the ad hoc approach of foreign troops occupying a battle torn city.

Given this situation the continued Serb presence in Kosova appears unlikely. Now Serbs are seeking refuge elsewhere to such a rate that, “(I)n Belgrade, Archbishop Artemije and other leaders of Kosova's Serbian National Council urged some 100 Serbian refugees from the province to return to their homes. Artemije stressed that the refugees must go back if a Serbian presence is to be maintained in Kosova.’( RFE/RL, 1999b ) The large numbers of Serbs refugees seeking refuge in Serbia are often accommodated in cramped, collective housing. One report from a Serbian daily noted that in “Lebane, a town in the south and one of the poorest in Serbia, 55 people were infected with hepatitis A by the end of November...’( Milenko Vasovic’s report, 2000 ) Unquestionably the influx of Serbian Kosovars to Serbia has added to the all ready economically enfeebled FRY.

In June 2000 the safety of the Serb minority and the prospects for a multiethnic state reached a critical point. EU official Javier Solana, formerly NATO General Secretary, said, “the Serbian community in Kosovo has been treated in a manner that cannot be tolerated.”( RFE/RL, 2000f )The statement of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, that “understanding and tolerance in Kosovo remain scarce and reconciliation is far from a reality.” brought additional international attention to the deteriorating situation. These pronouncements perhaps led Hashim Thaçi and Ibrahim Rugova to condemn the violence. Thaçi stated “the rising waive of violence in Kosova is not in the interest of the citizens of Kosova.” Rugova’s response was, “these acts, regardless of perpetrators, pose a serious threat to the hard-won freedom, stability and peace in Kosova and must stop immediately.”( RFE/RL, 2000g ) Whether these statements will quell the violence remains questionable.
Ultimately Kosova’s status will have to be resolved. Given its present status as a UN protectorate with UN law supportive of self-determination elections are an inevitability. One step in that direction was an election for local officials that was held in October 2000. The result of ballot was surpassing support for Rugova’s party with Thaçi’s KLA supported group disappointed in the results.

Despite this step towards self-governance, Kouchner told the UN Security Council in New York on 6 March (2000) that it was time to hold talks on the province's political future and draft an interim constitution. Kouchner said the Security Council needs to define what it meant by "substantial autonomy" for Kosova suggesting that local elections for Kosova could be held in September or October but needs to fit into an overall political structure for the province that is still undefined. (RFE/RL, 2000c)

In the period before elections Kosova remains a virtual protectorate of the UN. (See above- Res.1244) Yet efforts have been taken to begin the process to self-governance. On December 15 UNMIK created a power-sharing council, The Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS) of Kosovo. No Serbs attended the signing ceremony, and it became immediately clear they were initially unwilling to participate in the council meetings. The body consisted of three Albanian key leaders Hashim Thaçi (the former KLA), Rexhep Qosja (United Democratic Movement), and Ibrahim Rugova (Democratic League of Kosovo). They join four members of the UN mission. The Council is headed by UNMIK’s Bernard Kouchner, who retains a veto over the Council’s decision. (RFE/RL, 1999c)

While this power sharing arrangement maybe a promising event, as it is hoped it will be the beginning of the end of UN rule and the start of the process towards
self-determination, the prognosis of its success is uncertain. If its first meeting where Rugova and Thaçi engaged in acrimonious debate over the shadow Parliament is indicative of its future, much needs to be done to bring the Kosovar Albanians, let alone the Kosovar Serbs together in a governing council. There was some encouraging news in April 2000 when Rada Trajkovic, despite violent action on the part of Serb extremist supporters of Milosevi, joined the Council as an observer representing Kosovar Serbian moderates. (RFE/RL, 2000d)

The deadline for transformation was 31 January 2000 when the former governmental offices should have been dissolved and representatives of political parties should have been integrated into the new Administrative Council. In accepting this agreement Thaçi and Rugova agreed to disband their provisional government into the UNMIK structure.

In December 2000, in a positive step to normalcy, the first Council of Ministers meeting was held. Here the international administrators were joined by their Kosovar counterparts representing the twenty JIAS departments debating the mundane concerns of approving next year's budget.(UNMIK News, 2000)

These developments may portend the eventual self-rule for Kosova. Yet, despite these prospects, it must be understood that according to Security Council Resolution 1244, only the UN’s civilian mission has legal and executive power in Kosovo.(Aim-Internet report, 1999c)

This seems to be reflected in reports that while Albanian Kosovar leadership representing the three main political groupings do participate in JIAS, their role tends to be limited to advising UNMIK chief, Bernard Kouchner, “rather than deciding and implementing policy”. Much remains before it can be concluded that the promise of self-determination will soon be realized.(Semini, 2000b)

This reality of a postponed independence seemingly is being accepted by the parties as indicated by Hashim Thaçi’s statement, "Independence will come once the Kosovars have decided on it and we have convinced the world" of the need for it.
With or without independence, critical to Kosova’s future is the need to establish justice for both the past and the future.

If the rule of law is to prevail, an essential precondition for governance, issues of the justice system must be resolved. Without a recognized state it is difficult to establish a working and effective justice system. Leaving the establishment of a justice system to the UN, creates its own problems.

Not only have the crimes of the past, that is the Serb ethnic cleansing not yet resulted in judgment, but the present lack of an effective justice system slows the path towards governance. The work of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia will because of its complexities and the extent of the crimes will take years to bring to justice the pursuers of ethnic cleansing. Unquestionably as the NATO Supreme Commander Wesley Clark said to members of the House Armed Services Committee in Washington on 17 February 2000 that "the key to a peaceful resolution and a successful exit from the region for U.S. forces and the forces of NATO is democratization in Yugoslavia and Milosevi's appearance at the international criminal tribunal in The Hague. Until he is taken to trial, until democracy is taken into Serbia, we're not going to see a resolution of the problem." (RFE/RL, 2000b) Chief ICTY prosecutor Carla Del Ponte supported this position when she said in March 2000 that 10 months from the issuing of the indictment she was "dismayed" that Milosevi still remains in power and is avoiding international justice. She insisted this situation "cannot be allowed to continue and I wish to remind the world that he is an indicted accused, who must be delivered to the Tribunal to face trial."(IWPR, 2000)

While Milosevi has lost his hold over the Serbian Government, he remains at large with many wondering whether he will ever be brought to justice in the Hague.

Steps to Bring a Human Rights Culture to Kosovo/a

The Role of Education in the Building of a Democratic Kosovo
Unquestionably the education system must reflect the values of human rights. What follows is an excerpt of UNESCO official Paolo Fontani. Paolo along with this author did an assessment mission to Kosova in Fall 1999 and then he spent the Spring 2000 working along with UNMIK working on the education problem. These are his remarks describing UNMIK’s efforts to alter the education system:

While until 1990 the Province of Kosovo enjoyed certain autonomy within the Yugoslav State, a new Serbian constitution adopted that year transferred rule over the province, including its education system, to Belgrade. Though they constituted in average 10 percent of the school population, Serb students were allocated most of the time and of the premises, with the result that Albanian students were forced to attend classes in two, three or more shifts.

The Kosovar Albanians developed then their own Albanian-language school system, using their share of the educational establishments as well as private houses or other premises. Albanian teachers and university professors, who had been dismissed from their posts following the new regulations, were employed by this parallel system of education, with financing coming from parallel taxes or contributions from Kosovars abroad.

Years of disinterest from the central government produced a depletion of the educational buildings as well as a scarcity of pedagogical materials. The few contacts with the outside world, the lack of training and of academic exchanges, the non-availability of innovative publications and research, the outdated curricula and teaching methods characterized the otherwise meritorious parallel system of education. The civil war that ravaged Kosovo during the first half of 1999 brought further destruction, leaving an education system that badly needed major restructuring.

Such was the scenario to which the United Nations Interim Administrative Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was confronted at its inception, in July-August 1999. One of the first priorities of the officers in charge with education was to define, together with their Kosovar counterparts, towards what kind of education they were heading to. An early paper issued by the UNMIK Department of Education and Science identified the Education Sector goals as:
To re-establish/reconstruct the educational system in Kosovo to help fulfil every person’s right to education;

To build a single, unified, non-discriminatory and inclusive education system which would provide quality-learning opportunities to all irrespective of their ethnic or social origin, race or gender, religion, political or other opinion. [In the medium term, UNMIK envisages a multi-ethnic education system based on one unified curriculum taught through different language streams];

To improve the quality and relevance of education to meet the population’s diverse educational needs, to empower individuals and communities with the necessary knowledge, skills and values required for personal, social and economic development;

To strengthen educational administration, management and policy formulation so that the educational system can respond effectively to emerging challenges, contribute to the transition to and consolidation of the democratisation process, and promote a culture of tolerance, peace and understanding among individuals, communities and people from different cultural and ethnic backgrounds.

The initial, stringent need was to create the infrastructure conditions to re-start the school year, with the always-present thought of the approaching winter. At the same time, a policy work was done at the central level to ensure a framework within which the education system could exist and be managed. Towards this end, for instance, it was decided to base the curricula for the 1999-2000 school year on the two curricula (Serbian and Albanian) in use in Kosovo in 1998-1999, with all the exclusions or additions determined through a rapid review of textbooks and following a set of agreed curricular principles. At the same time, a consortium of donors was formed and large-scale printing and distribution of textbooks (about two millions) was implemented.

… It seems a common understanding (at least on paper), that education is much more than just information and knowledge. Education means to empower an individual to become an active participant in the life of his or her society. Education is one of the keys to social transformation, since a democracy is strong if its citizens participate, if they are able to express their opinions and take part in the affairs that concern them, be it at the local, national or supranational level. It is also through our schools and universities that we can …
There are a number of local NGOs that are actively working to bring a human rights regime to Kosovo/a. The focus of this paper does not allow for a full description of the efforts. Groups like the Council for Human Rights and Freedoms and the Humanitarian Law Center have a long history of addressing human rights complaints. New groups are actively seeking too later the mentality of Kosava’s people. Under the leadership of Dr. Neshad Asllani the Kosova Center for Human Rights in Peja has already engaged in training projects for teachers in the teaching of human rights in the local schools. With the financial support of the Finnish Human Rights Project and the skills of UNESCO teachers from Finland, the first of many training sessions was held to prepare Kosovar teachers in the human rights education.

One of the more promising developments for achievement of human rights is the establishment of a Human Rights Centre at the University of Prishtina. Under the leadership of the World University Service (WUS, Austria) the University agreed to provide space for a Human Rights Centre housed in the Faculty of Law. This summer the author facilitated the inclusion of Abo Akademi of Turku, Finland in the effort. With financial contributions from the Finnish Human Rights Project, WUS and the support of HRAP of Utica College of Syracuse University (USA) the Centre is scheduled to open its doors by February 2001. The author will assume the position as consultants and work with the newly appointed Director, Enver Hansani in creating a
institute that will house a human rights library, engage in scholarly research in human rights and train NGOs in the fundamentals of human rights.

WUS has created such Centres in Sarajevo and other places in the Balkans. The Prishtina Centre will be part of an evolving network of institutions dedicated to the human rights cause in troubled peninsula.

**Kosova Time Line 1986 - 2000**

Sources: Het Parool, Netherlands July 1999

The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (Indictment of Slobodan Milosevi, et. al)

Radio Free Europe (RFE) reports

Solana Article- *Foreign Affairs* Nov./Dec. 1999


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Slobodan Milosevi elected Chairman of Serbian League</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 1987</td>
<td>Milosevi speech in Kosova endorsing Serbian Nationalist Agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Slobodan Milosevi re-elected Chairman of Serbian League</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 3, 1989</td>
<td>Public security becomes responsibility of the Yugoslav Federal Government rather than Serbia by imposing “special measures”.</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 23, 1989</td>
<td>Kosovo Assembly (with Kosovar Albanians abstaining) approves proposed amendments to the Constitution, even though there is less than the necessary 2/3 support.</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 28, 1989</td>
<td>Serbian Assembly approves Constitutional changes revoking Kosovo autonomy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early 1990</td>
<td>Kosovar Albanians demonstrations against the “special measures”.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
April 1990  Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) lifted “special measures” and Serbian police assumed responsibility for Kosovo.

July 1990  Kosovo Assembly passed unofficial resolution declaring an equal and independent entity within SFRY Serbian Assembly suspends Kosovo Assembly

Dec. 9 and 26, 1990  Milosevi elected President of Serbia in multiparty elections

Late 1990 through 1991
—Kosovo Albanian professionals were dismissed from their jobs.
—The local court was abolished and many Albanian judges were removed.
—Police violence against ethnic Albanians was increased
—Albanian schools were closed
—Kosovo leadership, via non-violent civil resistance, established unofficial institutions, ‘parallel institutions’, e.g., health care and education sectors.


April 27, 1992  SFRY reconstituted as Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) after Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia declare their independence.

May 24, 1992  Kosovar Albanians vote for an Assembly and President.

Dec. 20, 1992  Slobodan Milosevi re-elected President of Serbia.

1995-96  Kosovar Albanians organized the nationalist group, Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës (UÇK –Military Liberation of Kosova) in English, Kosova Liberation Army (KLA).

July 15, 1997  Slobodan Milosevi is elected President of FRY. (Assumes office 23 July) He becomes the Supreme Commander of the Serbian military, and FRY police force (VJ).

Early 1998
—Conflict between KLA and VJ and paramilitary units intensifies.
—Widespread destruction of Kosova property, expulsions of civilians from KLA
areas, and many internally displaced from their homes (UN estimate 298,000 persons).

March 31, 1998  UN Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 1160 condemning excessive force of Serbian police forces against Kosovars. SC Res. 1160 imposed an arms embargo on FRY relying on Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

April 1998  The Serbian military shelled Drenica one of the poorest region of Kosovo. 25,000 Kosovars fled to Northern Albania (Tropoja) and sought refuge with Albanian families.

September 23, 1998  UNSC passes Res. 1199 concludes “the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region.”  The resolution demanded “all parties cease hostilities...(and that) the security forces used for civilian repression be withdrawn.”  It decided “should the concrete measures demanded in this resolution and 1160 (1988) not be taken, to consider further action and additional measures to maintain or restore peace and stability to the region.”


Oct. 16, 1998  —After negotiations with FRY, NATO and OSCE, an agreement was made to create the Kosovo Verification Mission.
—The mission verified Albanian killings, e.g. Racak. (1/15/99).

Jan. 15, 1999  The Racak massacre- 45 Kosovar Albanians including women and a child is killed.

Feb. 6, 1999  The international peace conference begins, Rambouillet, France included in negotiations are Pres. Milosevi, Nikola Sainovic, Deputy PM (FRY), KLA representatives, Kosovar political and civic leaders.  Violence in Kosova continues and intensifies with FRY forces attacking Kosova villages and towns.

From ICTY Indictment: “…orchestrated actions…”  “Forces of the FRY and Serbian acting in concert have engaged in a well planned and coordinated campaign of destruction of
property owned by Kosovar Albanian civilians.’

Feb. 23, 1999  Kosovar Albanians agree in principle to a peace plan.

— The Milosevi government refuses to sign.
— Peace talks collapse.

March 24, 1999  — “Operation Allied Force” NATO begins launching air strikes against targets in the FRY.
— Albanian Kosovars flock to Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro or flee to the mountains for refuge.

April 1999  Yugoslavia brings a case to the ICJ against ten NATO states arguing the attack on its sovereignty was illegal.

May 24, 1999  The ICTY indicts Slobodan Milosevi for War Crimes.

June 3, 1999  Pres. Milosevi accepts NATO demands.

June 9, 1999  NATO occupies Kosova after FRY forces leave for Serbia.

Beginning June 9, 1999
— A quarter million refugees return to Kosova.
— UNHCR, Geneva (24 June) announces that more than 250,000 refugees have returned to Kosova since NATO forces entered the province, almost one-third of all refugees who fled the region.
— On 23 June alone, 34,500 refugees went home, including 15,200 from Macedonia, 16,500 from Albania, and 2,800 from Montenegro.
— Almost all of the remaining refugees return during the summer of 1999.

June 10, 1999  UNMIK Established – SC Res. 1244
The UN Security Council passes resolution 1244 whereby, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, it establishes an international civil presence in Kosovo creating the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).

June 21, 1999  UÇK (KLA) agrees to disarm.

— UÇK commander Çeku announces that about 4,000 former UÇK (KLA) soldiers apply.
August 4, 1999        UNHCR estimates that 765,000 refugees of the 800,000 return to Kosovo.
September 19, 1999   UÇK (KLA) disarms publicly in Prishtina.
                     —The political parties agree to disband and set a January 31, 2000 deadline to integrate their provisional governments into a UN governing agency.
February 17, 2000   Slobodan Milosevi was reelected head of his Socialist Party.
September 25-October 6, 2000  

Vojislav Kostunica wins election of the Yugoslav presidency with street protests in his support. Slobodan Milosevi cedes power and leaves the capital

October 28, 2000    Local election in UNMIK governed Kosovo. A victory for Rugova’s party
November 2, 2000    Yugoslavia is readmitted to the United Nations.
December 2000      The Human Rights Centre at the University of Pristina holds its first Steering Board Meeting. A director is appointed and Prof. Theodore Orlin of HRAP, Utica College of Syracuse University assumes a consultancy where the efforts of WUS, Austria, Abo Akademi Finland and the Finnish Human Rights Project are coordinated along with other international donors.
Notes


科索渥—人權關懷的遠景

本文摘錄與修改自即將出版的《阿爾巴尼亞・科索渥的難民危機及其餘波》一書，該書反應出科索渥事件的大事紀，以及作者於2000年底親訪Prishtina的印象。

本文重新探討了環繞塞爾維亞種族淨化政策的人權危機、所引發的難民危機、北大西洋公約組織的介入，以及聯合國在這些不穩定地區去建立人權機制的努力。

關鍵字：科索渥、阿爾巴尼亞、塞爾維亞種族淨化政策、聯合國、人權