摘要

近一世紀以來《邏輯哲學論叢》留給研究者許多難題，且至今未見一個令人滿意的詮釋版本。由於它包含了符號邏輯和非邏輯的問題（如生命問題）兩種主題而造成兩種不同的詮釋傾向；如黛菛注意到必須先掌握住維根斯坦的哲學觀點才能有正確的詮釋，而黑克認為它主要是處理符號邏輯的理論問題。

於是兩方對《邏輯哲學論叢》有很多相左的解讀，如「可說與只可顯示的區別」、如何了解《邏輯哲學論叢》脈絡裡的「無意義」、丟掉「梯子」的合理說明、論題6.54是否導致《邏輯哲學論叢》的內容不一致？維根斯坦到底是「說」抑或「顯示」了那些「不可說的」？總結以上問題黑克強調維根斯坦在《邏輯哲學論叢》中是「顯示」而不是「說」了「不可說的真理」。反之，黛菛主張沒有所謂的「不可說的真理」，而且「可說與只可顯示的區別」也屬於梯子的一部分到最後必須一起丟掉才對。這場爭執易讓人以為是《邏輯哲學論叢》引起的，然衝突其實來自他們的預設及缺漏的詮釋。首先，我將論證上述兩方詮釋本身有許多不一致的地方；再者，他們的詮釋會使《邏輯哲學論叢》遭遇更多困難。

我試圖把《邏輯哲學論叢》視為一整體，從維根斯坦的自序直到結論提供一個一致的新詮釋，新詮釋顯示「不可說的」既不是符號邏輯也不是生命問題；並且證明在《邏輯哲學論叢》裡維根斯坦對生命問題的觀點是他的邏輯理論之應用結果，如此即消弭了兩方在符號邏輯與生命問題之間挖掘的鴻溝。

新詮釋試著修補過去對《邏輯哲學論叢》的某些疏忽，闡明「如何」登上梯子以及「為什麼」要拋開梯子，當我們能正確地看待世界才能明白維根斯坦批判傳統哲學問題還有劃界限後省思生命問題的立足點。

關鍵詞：堅決式解讀、不堅決式解讀、無意義的命題、可能事態、論證形式

Summary

  Since the publication of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, philosophers have been discussing about the details in the book. Some people, e.g. Russell, noted in 6.54 Wittgenstein’s claim that readers who understand him would recognize the propositions of Tractatus as nonsense. The claim seems to lead the book to self-defeating consequence. Hacker beliefs that the self-defeating problem could be solved by taking ethical, aesthetics propositions as nonsense and after throwing them away we could hold some ineffable truths. It has been widely received as the ‘traditional interpretation’ or labelled as the ‘irresolute reading.’ But Diamond doesn’t agree with the received interpretation. She emphasizes that when Wittgenstein says his propositions are nonsense, he means plain nonsense. This approach has been named the ‘resolute reading.’ It seems that both Wittgenstein’s philosophy and the book Tractatus are inconsistent. However, I give some suggestions for reconciling debates between Diamond and Hacker. I also try to offer a new interpretation and point out there might be third choice for avoiding the dilemma.

Key words:  resolute reading, irresolute reading, nonsensical propositions, possible states of affairs, argument forms