摘要

本論文旨在探討蒯因如何看待所謂的先驗知識，因此蒯因的哲學和先驗知識是本論文所要討論的重點所在。而先驗知識是本論文探討的重點，因此在論文的一開始我將先釐清什麼是先驗知識，之後我會從哲學史的脈絡當中來看，先驗知識是如何出現的，以及它具有什麼樣不同於經驗知識的特色。等到我對先驗知識這個議題作出一個清楚的釐清之後，我接著就要探討蒯因面對先驗知識的態度和立場。由於我認為蒯因面對先驗知識的態度是負面的，因此我會先從蒯因反對和先驗知識密切相關的一些概念如「分析」與「必然」來看，他是如何由此進一步反對先驗知識；此外，我還將從蒯因的自然化知識論、語言發生學、指涉的不可測度性來看他如何反駁先驗知識。

關鍵字: 蒯因、先驗知識、分析、必然、自然化知識論、語言發生學、指涉的不可測度性

Abstract

The purpose of my thesis is to discuss W.V. Quine’s views regarding a priori knowledge, therefore Quine’s general philosophical points of view and the issues of a priori knowledge will be the main focus of my discussion. A priori knowledge is the key point in my discussion, so at beginning I will clarify what a priori knowledge exactly is. Then, I will proceed to look how a priori knowledge appears from the history of philosophy and what characteristics it has in order to be different from experience knowledge. When I clear up the issues of a priori knowledge, I also want to examine Quine’s attitude and position toward a priori knowledge. Because I think Quine’s attitude toward a priori knowledge is fundamentally nagative, I will start from Quine’s oppositions of some concepts like “analyticity” and “necessity” which have close relationship with a priori knowledge, and then look into how Quine further rejects a priori knowledge. In addition, I also exhibit how Quine, based on his views about naturalized epistemology, the generic approach of language learning, and inscrutability of reference, rejects a priori knowledge.

Key Words: Quine, a priori knowledge, analytic, necessary, naturalized epistemology, the generic approach of language learning, inscrutability of reference