摘要
這篇論文起於黛萌在〈吃肉與吃人〉對辛格道德理論的批評。我的目的是藉由重整黛萌的論述來表明辛格方法的限制,其主要面向有:道德思考的性質、日常生活的重要性、人與動物的不同,以及素食主義的道德要求。
我的做法是:藉由比較黛萌與辛格的方法,揭露兩人背後的假定與哲學上認同的部份。而結論是:指出我們對人(與動物)的生命的理解不該被限制在對道德思維單一模式的恪守上。
關鍵字:黛萌、辛格、思維模式、人、動物
Abstract
The starting point of this thesis is Cora Diamond’s critique of Peter Singer’s moral theory in her essay “Eating Meat and Eating People”. My aim is to demonstrate the limitations of Singer’s approach by reconstructing major aspects of Diamond’s discussion: the nature of moral thinking, the importance of ordinary life, the difference between human beings and animals, the moral requirements of vegetarianism.
By comparing Diamond’s and Singer’s approaches, I bring out their deeper assumptions and philosophical commitments. I conclude by pointing out that our understanding of human (and animal) life should not be limited by adhering to one single model of moral thinking.
Keywords:Cora Diamond, Peter Singer, mode of thought, human being, animal