>>論文摘要下載（pdf格式）

摘要

 科學實在論與反實在論之爭的主要爭執之處在於不可觀察對象是否為真實實體以及科學理論所描述者是否有機會為真實。本文試圖從Cartwright的觀點出發，以切入科學實在論與反實在論的討論。

 本文所欲討論的主要內容如下：(一) Cartwright以因果說明為基礎對理論實體的承認是否可靠；(二) Cartwright主張基本定律（fundamental law）為極簡模型（minimal model）的情境描述，因此基本定律無法說明複雜的現實條件的論點是否正確。

   最後，我們進一步討論反實在論承認可觀察實體但否定不可觀察實體的觀點有其內在的矛盾。同時我將論證，基於發展至今的科學，不可觀察實體比可觀察實體更加可靠。另一方面，在科學基本論（fundamentalism）與科學多元論（pluralism）兩個科學圖像間，科學多元論的論點有內在矛盾，而導致其無法有效判斷真實。

關鍵字：Cartwright、科學實在論、科學反實在論、理論實體、科學基本論、科學多元論

Abstract

The debate between scientific realist and antirealist is about whether theoretical(i.e. un- observable) entities exist and whether scientific theories are true. The aim of this thesis is to discuss Nancy Cartwright's view on this issue. Two topics are discussed in this thesis. First, is Cartwright's admitting theoretical entities by virtue of causal explanation plausible? Second, is Cartwright's opinion that fundamental laws are false in mostly complex world acceptable?

I argue that according to contemporary science, theoretical entities are more realistic than observable entities, and hence it is inconsistent to admit observable entities and deny theoretical entities. I also argue that Cartwright's scientific pluralism against fundamentalism could lead to contradiction.