Abstract
What is the function of memory in epistemic justification? Epistemic preservationism, the traditional view of memorial justification, maintains that memory can merely preserve, but not generate, justification for a memory belief. This traditional view, nonetheless, is challenged by Jennifer Lackey (2005). She provides three counterexamples to the traditional view. Furthermore, she proposes epistemic generativism, a view according to which memory is capable of generating new justification for a memory belief. In defending epistemic preservationism, Thomas Senor (2007, 2017) raises two objections to Lackey. Firstly, all cases raised by Lackey fail to be counterexamples to epistemic preservationism; secondly, even they could become counterexamples to epistemic preservationism, they still cannot support the view that memory is a generative epistemic source. In this essay, I evaluate Lackey’s and Senor’s accounts by examining their counterexamples and arguments, while also explore both of their underlying assumptions. With these examinations, I argue that neither of the accounts is satisfactory due to certain obstacles they encounter. Further amendments are thus required so as to deal with those problems.
Keywords：memory, justification, epistemic preservationism, epistemic generativism, generative epistemic source
摘要
對於「記憶在知識證成中的功能」這個問題上，有兩個相互衝突的理論：知態保留論和知態生成論。作為傳統主流的觀點，知態保留論者主張，記憶只能保留過去主體對信念的證成，而不能夠對信念產生新的證成。但這種傳統觀點受到Jennifer Lackey (2005)的質疑：她提供三個反例加以駁斥知態保留論。此外，Lackey進一步主張知態生成論，也就是「記憶能夠對信念生成新的證成」。其後，Thomas Senor (2007, 2017)也對Lackey的觀點提出兩類反對意見：第一，Lackey提出的案例都不足以為知態保留論的反例；第二，即便這些案例可以成為知態保留論的反例，它們仍然無法支持知態生成論的論點。本論文主要工作是，藉由檢視Lackey和Senor分別提供的案例、論證、以及他們各自具有的預設，指出他們的主張都難以成立，並有進一步修正之必要。
關鍵字：、記憶、證成、知態保留論、知態生成論、生成的知態來源