瑪麗真的有學到新知識嗎？
—傑克森「知識論證」變遷之探究
摘要
1982年傑克森依據一個認知上的直覺提出知識論證，並據以反對物理主義，這個直覺幾乎是每個人都會同意的：沒有看過紅色的人不會知道紅色看起來是怎樣的。我們可以接受這個直覺去贊同知識論證，或採取其他觀點對知識論證提出質疑而反駁它。1998年後的傑克森利用哈曼所提的內涵性質和功能主義的表徵理論來理解知覺經驗，依此解釋掉知識論證的直覺並放棄知識論證。
本文旨在探討傑克森前後期思想上的轉變，說明現在的他如何利用表徵理論來理解知覺經驗，並討論該直覺與知識論證之間的關係。
關鍵字：傑克森、知識論證、感質、哈曼、內涵性質、表徵理論
Abstract
In 1982, Frank Jackson advocated the now well known Knowledge argument, which is based upon our strong epistemic intuition. Almost no one disagrees with that intuition: that people who have never experienced redness can not know what it is like to see red. We can retain the intuition and thereby accept the argument, or we may reject the intuition and hence the argument. Jackson, however, changed his mind since 1998. He takes a functionalist-representationalist position and understands sensory experiences in terms of the so-called “intensional property" proposed by Gilbert Harman. At this stage, he explains away the intuition and gives up the Knowledge argument.
The thesis is for the purpose of discussing Jackson’s change, explaining how he understands sensory experiences in functionalist representationalist terms, and re-examining the relation between the epistemic intuition and the knowledge argument.
Key words: Jackson, knowledge argument, qualia, Harman, intensional property, representationalism