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摘要

 德性這個概念越來越受重視，不論是在知識論或倫理學上都備受矚目，因為利用這個靈活的概念可以幫助我們以不同於其他規則依循的理論的方法去解決問題。但在倫理學領域中，以德性作為理論核心的德性理論，遭遇了來自情境主義的挑戰。情境主義試圖利用來自於經驗性實驗的成果否定德性的存在；要是情境主義者成功了，那麼德性理論所說的內容將淪於空談。所幸，情境主義者的攻擊是能夠被回應的，德性理論者能夠找出他們論述之中的破綻而回應之。

然而在德性倫理學者與情境主義者的爭辯過程中，我們看見經驗證據似乎只為情境主義者所用，或甚至與德性的存在處於對立的狀態。德性理論的說明與我們日常之中用以解釋人類行動的看法最為接近，卻不被經驗所支持，這種情況有違我們的直覺。Nancy Snow的理論則替我們做出了德性理論與經驗基礎良好結合的示範，德性理論當中的內容能夠得到心理學上的經驗基礎所支持。Snow的理論不但可以回應情境主義的攻擊，化解經驗證據與德性倫理學的對立，並且還能夠在回應德性倫理學所遭遇的反對時展現更好的說明效力。這些優點都顯示經驗基礎的使用對於德性倫理學是有利的，由情境主義者的攻擊當中所產生的疑慮也得以消除。

關鍵字：德性、德性倫理學、情境主義、Nancy Snow

Abstract

The idea of virtue has been gradually emphasized in contemporary epistemology and ethics. This flexible idea can help us to solve problems with ways that differ from rule-based ethical theories. But in the realm of ethics, virtue ethics, which regards virtue as its core conception, encounters a challenge from philosophical situationism. Philosophical situationists use empirical experiments to deny the existence of virtue; and if situationists succeed, then virtue ethics will be reduced to talk about empty words. Fortunately, virtue ethicists can respond the situationist challenge.

In the debate between virtue ethics and situationism, we can see those empirical evidences are only served to situationism, or even opposed to virtue ethics. However, this counters our intuition because virtue ethics' accounts of virtue are closer to our daily viewpoints. Nancy Snow's theory offers a model that combines virtue theory with empirical ground. Her theory can respond the situationist challenge more clearly and resolve the opposition between virtue ethics and empirical evidences. This essay investigates the ways in which Snow develops an empirically grounded conception of virtue which resists the situationist challenge.