從詮釋到實踐：規則依循問題的另一種可能
摘要
本文的主要目的在於為語言使用的規則依循問題提出一個發生學的說明。
首先，筆者將論證，傳統意義理論把意義視為語言與對象之間的規律性詮釋的作法是不當的。正如Wittgenstein的規則依循悖論所批評的，語言與對象之間可被詮釋的規律性有無限多種，我們無法確定哪種規律性才是語言使用的恰當說明。也因此，當這些規律性彼此相衝突時，會有既對又錯的悖論產生。然而，這些秉持詮釋觀點的意義理論也不能訴諸特定的語意事實來確定哪個規律性才是正確的，因為，正如Kripke所論證的一般，語言使用所擁有的規範性無法用語意事實來說明。
Kripke的意義懷疑論不僅在消極意義上否定了語意事實的功能，更在積極的意義上指出，語意規則並不是個獨立於使用者之外的規範性，而是語言使用者與一社群互動之後所產生的實踐規則。然而，筆者將論證，Kripke以社群一致性來作為規範性的說明並不恰當，因為，社群雖然有可能成為實踐環境中客觀限制的一部份，卻不是必然的一部份。當我們把規則依循的問題從詮釋轉移至實踐時，我們同時要考量到，不同的實踐環境會型塑出不同的實踐規則。所以，筆者將以Wittgenstein的「生活形式」為基礎，發展一種發生學的解釋，並進一步論證，實踐規則的建立是相對於其所處環境的客觀限制的，至於這些限制之中是否包含社群的因素，則是個次要的問題。Kripke的說明雖然恰巧能與我們語言使用的社會性相符，但這並不是因為他的說明是成功的，而是因為，社群恰巧在這實際脈絡構成了實際客觀限制的一部份。當我們考量到其它生活形式的可能時，我們會發覺，Wittgenstein的生活形式為我們許諾了一種更為開放的眼光，讓我們就規則實際的發生脈絡來考量規則，而不像個人論與社群論的爭議一般，把眼光侷限於人數的多寡之上。
關鍵字：Wittgenstein、Kripke、規則依循、生活形式、發生學說明
Abstract
This thesis is to propose a genetic account of rule-following problem.
First, I would argue that the traditional view of meaning identifying meaning as entity is problematic. Wittgenstein's the rule-following paradox reveals that the possible regularities between a linguistic expression and the expressed object are infinite. Since we cannot determine which possibility is the correct one, none of the regularities to be used to fix the meaning of that expression. If those co-existing regularities are the case, the paradox would occur when they are incompatible to one another. Moreover, the traditional view cannot appeal to meaning fact to determine which regularity is the correct one, because the normativity in the language use cannot be explained by meaning fact, as Kripke has argued.
Kripke’s meaning skepticism does not simply refuse the role of meaning fact. He also positively points out that the linguistic rules are not a kind of normativity independent of language use, but the practical rules generated from interactions between an agent and a community. However, I will argue that it is not appropriate to appeal to social agreement to explain normativity, because even if it may be possible for a community to be a part of objective limitations in the practical circumstance, the community is not a necessary part of them. When we shift the rule-following problem from interpretation to practice, we also need to consider that different practical circumstances will shape different kinds of practical rules. Therefore, I will develop Wittgenstein’s ‘forms of life’, and propose a ‘genetic account’ of rule-following problem. Further, I will argue that the establishment of practical rules is primarily relative to the situated objective limitations, and whether these limitations include communal factors or not is a derivative problem. Although Kripke’s account coincides with the actual social property of our language use, this is not because of the success of his account, but because of the actual context of language use having community to be a part of its objective limitations. When we consider different possibilities for the forms of life, we will find that Wittgenstein’s forms of life promise us a more liberal way to discuss the problem of following a rule, and we should not confine our focus on the numbers of person, just as the debates between individualism and communalism.
Keywords: Ludwig Wittgenstein, Saul Kripke, rule-following, forms of life, genetic account