Putnam論無分界面的認識論
摘要
反實在論或非實在的爭辯長久以來是哲學中很重要的一個議題，一方面實在論被形容為接受「遍及形上學可能世界的同一性」、「對於世界的絕對概念」等等神秘的觀念，另一方面反實在論或非實在論則被形容為「對實在世界不負責任」。Hilary Putnam認為在這兩者之外有第三條，能夠讓我們了解知識宣稱對實在是負責任的，而無需接受形上學的幻想。
筆者在這篇文章中的主要目的，便是要研究Putnam對於這個對實在負責任的理論，也就是自然實在論的主張。本文分為三個部份，第一部份筆者探討Putnam轉向自然實在論之前的一些主張，包括語意外部論和內在實在論，而這些主張被一些哲學家如John McDowell批評為在知覺者和世界之間設置一個「分界面」這樣不必要的概念，妨礙了我們關於世界的說法，使得「語言如何勾住世界？」以及「知覺如何勾住世界？」成為了急迫卻又無法回答的問題。第二部份筆者則接續研究Putnam遭受這些批評之後，作了哪些徹底的省思而轉而主張自然實在論，並且從對知覺問題的討論，來勾勒出自然實在論的立場。在第三部份筆者將會探究Putnam如何以自然實在論的思維模式，來談論事實與價值的交纏這個他關心已久的議題，以期能更加深入了解這個沒有分界面的認識論。
關鍵詞：自然實在論、內在實在論、語意外部論、分界面、實用主義、笛卡兒附帶唯物論、邏輯實證論、相對主義
Abstract
The debate between realism and antirealism or irrealism has been one of the most important philosophical issues for a long time. Realism is described as embracing such mysterious notions as “identity across metaphysical possible worlds” and “the absolute conception of the world”; on the other hand, antirealism or irrealism is described as “irresponsible to the world”. Hilary Putnam claims that there is a third way with the realism issue which does justice to our sense that knowledge claims are responsible to reality without accepting metaphysical fantasy.
The aim of this article is to research how Putnam talks about natural realism which is responsible to reality. There are three parts in this article. In Part one, it is the study of the positions, including semantic externalism and internal realism, which Putnam advocates before he turns to natural realism. These positions are criticized by philosophers such as John McDowell and few others as the setting up of an interface between perceivers and the world, which he also comments as an unnecessary concept. The interface hinders us from talking about the world, and questions like ‘How does perception hook on to the world?’ and ‘How does language hook on to the world?’ have became urgent and insolvable problems. In Part two, the contents are further carried on the critics and Putnam’s new positions. The chapter starts with discussing the problem of perception. In part three, it is the argumentation of how Putnam talks about the fact-value entanglement which is the issue he concerns for a long time by means of his natural realism, and the arguments will help to understand Putnam’s epistemology without interface.
Keywords: natural realism, internal realism, semantic externalism, interface, pragmatism, Cartesian cum Materialist, logical positivism, relativism