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摘要

 Edmund L. Gettier在其著名的論文 “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”中檢視傳統知識的三條件，提出對傳統知識定義的批判。傳統的知識論著重在認知過程中認知者能力的展現，後Gettier時代，從當代內在論與外在論的爭辯中可以看出，知識論開始強調對於知識不同的直覺，在「能力」與「反運氣」這兩個直覺之間互相拉鋸，試圖為知識尋求新的定義。我的論文主要將環繞著這兩個直覺，預計分為五章來討論。第一章我將討論知識的三條件說與後Gettier時代對於Gettier式反例的發展。第二章我將討論內在論與其對知識所抱持的能力直覺。第三章我將討論外在論與其對知識所抱持的反運氣直覺。在第二章與第三章中我同時也會檢視這些分別主張內在論與外在論立場所提出的質疑與回應，在處理Gettier式的反例時有什麼樣的困難？這些困難是來自於理論本身的缺失或者是當我們採取一種試圖從本質定義知識的方式時必然會遇到的困難？第四章我將引入德性知識論與反運氣德性知識論的討論。Duncan Pritchard認為德性知識論仍然過度著眼於認知者的能力，卻忽略了反運氣的條件，因此Gettier式的反例仍舊會一再出現。要徹底解決這個問題就必須能夠理解我們在分析知識時其實必須兼顧兩個直覺，即能力直覺與反運氣直覺。這兩者在知識論的光譜上是兩個極端，越傾向於一端就會失去另一端，反例就會趁隙而生，唯有同時兼具能力與反運氣的直覺才能徹底解決Gettier的難題。Pritchard自己提出的反運氣德性知識論就是嘗試結合兩者的一個知識理論。最後，在結論部分會試圖回答，我們對知識的兩個直覺（亦即，能力與反運氣），是否真的是光譜的兩端而缺一不可？我們是否需要一個同時兼具二個直覺的知識論理論才能徹底處理Gettier問題？

關鍵字：德性知識論、反運氣德性知識論、Duncan Pritchard、能力直覺、反運氣直覺

Abstract

After Edmund L. Gettier presented his famous essay “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge” and criticized the traditional definition of knowledge, contemporary epistemology can be seen as the debates between epistemic internalism and epistemic externalism. Both of them seek to improve or replace the traditional JTB (Justification-Truth-Belief) definition of knowledge. However, internalism focuses on the cognitive abilities of the cognitive agent, while externalism emphasizes on the anti-luck condition of our cognitive processes. My thesis will be centered on these two different intuitions of ability and anti-luck, and will be divided into five chapters. In the first chapter I will discuss the so-called JTB conditions of knowledge and the Gettier-style counterexamples in the development of post-Gettier era. In the second chapter I will discuss the thesis of internalism and the ability intuition which it holds for knowledge. In the third chapter I will discuss the thesis of externalism and the anti-luck intuition which it holds. In the fourth chapter I will introduce the most recent theories of knowledge regarding virtue epistemology and anti-luck epistemology. Duncan Pritchard argues that the virtue theory of knowledge is still excessively focused on the abilities of the cognitive agent and ignores the intuition of anti-luck condition, so the Gettier-style counterexamples will still be unavoidable. In order to solve the Gettier problem, Prichard argues and insists that there must be two different conditions which can accommodate our two different intuitions of knowledge. Pritchard's own anti-luck virtue epistemology is an attempt to combine both intuitions and form a satisfactory theory. In conclusion, I will try to answer whether it is necessary that our two different intuitions must be treated as two separated conditions as two extreme ends of the same spectrum of knowledge. Can’t we have an epistemological theory which would combine two intuitions at the same time and successfully deal with the Gettier problem?