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摘要

 知識的價值是什麼？知識是否具有獨特的價值？直覺上，我們認為知識具有自身的價值，我們也認為知識比起僅僅只是真的信念還有價值。但是，這直覺是否可靠？當代的知識理論是否能合理說明此一直覺呢？所謂的「淹沒難題」即是指出當代重要的知識論立場之一的可靠論並無法成功說明我們這個直覺。本論文試圖指出某種型態的可靠論是可以適切地回應淹沒難題。

本論文第一章說明何謂價值問題，指出其歷史根源（可回溯至古希臘時期的柏拉圖）以及此一問題的三種可能意涵。第二章探討Linda Zagzebski如何以咖啡的類比批評可靠論，特別是指出在可靠論的知識定義下，知識並未比僅只為真的信念更有價值。第三章說明並評論可靠論者的代表人物Alvin Goldman（及Erik Olsson）對於淹沒難題的回應。在指出Goldman的可靠論回應的缺點後，第四章考察可靠論的另一主要型式Ernest Sosa德性知識論對淹沒難題的回應，闡述為何德性知識論的回應方式比起可靠論者的回應方式要來的好。

   關鍵字：價值問題、淹沒難題、可靠論、德性知識論

Linda Zagzebski、Alvin Goldman、Erik Olsson、Ernest Sosa 

Abstract

What is the value of knowledge? Does knowledge have its distinctive value? Intuitively, we think that edge has intrinsic value, and we also think that knowledge is more valuable than merely true belief. But, is this intuition reliable? Can the contemporary theories of knowledge sufficiently explain this intuition? The point of “the swamping problem”is to show that one of the contemporary views of epistemology —reliabilism— can’t meet this intuition. My thesis tries to argue that reliabilism of some sort can response to the swamping problem appropriately.

Chapter one of my thesis will explain what the value problem is, and will also point out its historical sources (which can be traced back to Plato in Greece) and three significant aspects about the value problem. Chapter two will discuss how Linda Zagzebski uses the coffee-making analogy to criticize reliabilism. Zegzebski draws the conclusion that under reliabilist definition of knowledge it is no more valuable than merely true belief. Chapter three will mention some proponents of reliabilim —Alvin Goldman and Erik Olsson —and explain how they respond to the swamping problem. Chatper four will explore some other form of reliabilism, that is Ernest Sosa’s virtue reliabilism, and explain how he responds to the problem. I will illustrate in my conclusion why the response of virtue epistemology is a more satisfactory response of the value problem in epistemology.

Linda Zagzebski、Alvin Goldman、Erik Olsson、Ernest Sosa