>>論文摘要下載（pdf格式）

摘要

 無論是在通俗還是學術的倫理討論中，道德上的兩難抉擇始終都是一個富有吸引力的議題。本文的研究將以威廉斯和芙特的論證交鋒為經緯，探討後設倫理學領域內關於道德衝突與道德實在論的論辯。就近代倫理學的發展觀之，威廉斯與芙特的這番對話至少帶來了兩項啟發。一方面，相較於獨尊理性的傳統進路，威廉斯對道德衝突的探討兼顧了日常的經驗層面，尤其是行為者心理感受的部分。這使得遺憾感、罪責感……等情緒不再被視作論述的附帶，而是躍居主線。另一方面，儘管「道德實在論」一詞常見於後設倫理學的脈絡，但是長久以來其只是表達一種立場，而缺乏真正的實質內涵。芙特的立論在一定程度上引領人們打破舊有的刻板印象，進而認識一個當代道德實在論體系的可能樣貌。

關鍵字：道德衝突、道德兩難、道德實在論、遺憾、剩餘、自然規範

Abstract

Moral dilemma is always a remarkable issue in popular or academic debates. This paper is an analysis of Williams' and Foot's arguments, concerning the relationship of moral dilemma and moral realism within the field of metaethics. In the development of the modern ethics, the debates have the following two aspects. Firstly, contrary to the traditional approach that the feelings of a moral agent are absent in moral debates, but now become the main theme of the argument, namely of the feelings of regret and guilt. Secondly, the concept of moral realism is proposed only formally in metaethical debates, but now clarified by Foot of its possible substantial content.