摘要
懷疑論一直是知識論上最難纏的敵人,而懷疑論者也總是提出各式各樣的懷疑,讓人疲於奔命。在面對「人們是不可能獲得客觀世界的知識」的懷疑論主張,要反駁這樣的主張也是很棘手的工作。然而,這樣的懷疑論者通常是以後設的立場提出其主張,所以,要反駁這樣的主張似乎也要以後設的立場來處理,如此才不會再度陷入懷疑論者所懷疑的範圍之中。面對懷疑論者的挑戰,有不同的解決的方法,其中有一種特別的反懷疑論之論證形式,這種論證被稱之為超驗論證。有關這些懷疑論與反懷疑論之論辯,是本篇論文的論述重點所在。
就如同有各種懷疑論,同樣地,也會有各種不同的超驗論證。在第一章所要處理的便是各種懷疑論,接著在第二章要討論的則是各種超驗論證。這兩者透過共同的焦點,以辯證對話的方式進一步的分析出,選擇「相信人們是有可能獲得客觀世界的知識」似乎是比較合理的。所以,第三章討論的是笛卡兒式的懷疑論,第四章則是以反對笛卡兒式的懷疑論之超驗論證為主。最後,本論文將論證:選擇「相信人們是有可能獲得客觀世界的知識」比起「相信人們不可能獲得客觀世界的知識」,是個更為合理的結論。
關鍵字:超驗論證、知識論、懷疑論、笛卡兒
Abstract
Skepticism is a powerful enemy in epistemology. In the history of western philosophy skeptics always doubt all kinds of things. It is hard to refuse the assertion of skepticism that it is impossible for people to get objective knowledge about the external world. However, this kind of skepticism usually has its stance on the second-level or meta-theoretical perspective. To refuse this kind of skepticism, we should at least stand on the same level. In that case we can escape from the scope of their doubt more easily. When we argue against skeptics’ challenge, there are several forms of solution. One of these is called transcendental argument. The skepticism and anti-skepticism debates will be the main focus of this thesis.
There are various kinds of skepticism, and there are various kinds of anti-skeptical transcendental arguments correspondingly. In the chapter one, I will begin with discussing various kinds of skepticism. In the chapter two, I will then discuss various kinds of transcendental argument. In the chapter three, I will focus on the Cartesian skepticism. In the final chapter, I will show some different forms of transcendental argument against the Cartesian skepticism. In the conclusion, I want to claim that choosing to believe that we can get the objective knowledge about external world is better than choosing to believe that it is impossible that we can.
Keywords:transcendental arguments, epistemology, skepticism, Descartes