論自然主義知識論與自然類
—對比蒯因與孔布里斯的觀點
摘要
本論文的主要目的是將蒯因與孔布里斯的自然主義知識論，尤其是自然類在自然主義知識論的角色，提供一個比較清楚的討論。
蒯因透過對傳統知識論的批評，進而提出知識論自然化的觀點。新的知識論，即自然主義知識論，應該以科學的方法來研究人類知識的獲得過程。透過對於類與相似性的討論中，可以清楚看出蒯因的自然主義知識論立場。對蒯因來說，類或相似性的概念也必須加以自然化，就如同知識論的自然化一樣。有關自然類的觀點，蒯因並不特別關心類是否存在於自然中這個存有學議題，他認為這應該由科學家來告訴我們，哲學家對於這個問題並沒有特殊的權利或超越的方法。
相較之下，在孔布里斯的自然主義知識論中，自然類扮演著相當重要的角色。他將自然主義知識論分成兩個問題來討論，分別是「我們所能認識的世界是什麼？」與「作為可能認識這個世界的我們是什麼？」。他主張世界是由自然類所組成，而認知者的我們也擁有對自然類敏感的概念結構。他認為一個成熟的自然科學將會告訴我們各種自然類的存在。很明顯地，孔布里斯對於自然類是站在實在論的立場。
所以，透過對於自然類的議題，我主張蒯因是屬於溫和的自然主義知識論者，而孔布里斯則是屬於極端的自然主義知識論者。
關鍵詞： 蒯因、孔布里斯、自然主義知識論、自然類
Abstract
The main purpose of this thesis is to present a clear discussion of Quine’s and Korblith’s naturalized epistemology, especially the role which natural kinds played in their proposals.
Quine criticized various views in traditional epistemology, and then put forward his new perspective of naturalized epistemology. The new epistemology, naturalistic epistemology should be seen as a scientific study with respect to man’s acquisition of knowledge. The concepts of “kinds” or “similarity”, just as Quine’s epistemology, are expected to be naturalized. Quine is not concerned about whether natural kinds exist in nature or not, because this should be told to us by science, rather than philosophy.
In contrast, in Kornblith’s epistemology, natural kinds play a very important role. He thinks naturalized epistemology can be discussed through two questions: (1) what is the world that we may know it? and (2) what are we that we may know the world? He thinks the world is divided by natural kinds, and that we have the conceptual structure of recognizing these natural kinds. He thinks the success of science is the best evidence that natural kinds really exist. It is clear that Kornblith argues for a realist view of natural kinds.
Based on different views of natural kinds, I conclude that Quine’s version of naturalistic epistemology is a modest standpoint, and Kornblith’s version is a more radical one.
Keywords: W. V. Quine, Hilary Kornblith, naturalized epistemology, natural kinds